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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the court by §78-2-2(3)(j), 
U.C.A. This appeal is from an order of the District Court of 
the Third Judicial District of Summit County, State of Utah 
denying a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's Complaint. This court 
ordered that an interlocutory appeal be granted on March 7, 
1990, pursuant to a Petition for Permission to Appeal pursuant 
to Rule 5, Rules of Appellate Procedure. The order to be 
reviewed is the Order dated December 28, 1989 and entered 
January 3, 1990. The Petition for Permission to Appeal was 
filed January 12, 1990. 
-v-
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
POINT I 
STANDARD'S COMPLAINT WAS NOT FILED WITHIN THREE MONTHS OF THE 
TRUSTEE'S SALE AS REQUIRED BY §57-1-32, U.C.A. THIS TIME 
RESTRICTION IS A JURISDICTIONAL CONDITION ON THE RIGHT TO A 
DEFICIENCY THAT IS NOT EXTENDED BY THE RENEWAL STATUTE OF §78-
12-40, U.C.A., WHICH APPLIES ONLY TO GENERAL STATUTES OF 
LIMITATION. 
POINT I.A 
THE UTAH TRUST DEED ACT IS TO BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AND THE 
RENEWAL STATUTE WAS NOT INTENDED TO ALTER THOSE STRICT 
REQUIREMENTS. 
POINT Z.B 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
WOULD NOT APPLY THE RENEWAL STATUTE TO THE UTAH TRUST DEED 
ACT. 
POINT I.C 
CAUSES OF ACTION CREATED BY STATUTE AND WHICH CONTAIN THEIR 
OWN TIME LIMITATIONS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY RENEWAL STATUTES. 
POINT I.D 
OF ALL THE UTAH CASES WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED THE APPLICATION 
OF THE RENEWAL STATUTE, NONE HAS APPLIED IT TO EXTEND THE 
TIME FOR FILING A STATUTORY CAUSE OF ACTION CONTAINING ITS 
OWN INTERNAL TIME LIMITATION. 
POINT II 
STANDARD'S CLAIM AGAINST KIRKBRIDE AND SOULE IS BARRED FOR 
FAILURE TO ALLOW THREE MONTHS FOR REINSTATEMENT UNDER §57-1-
24, U.C.A. OF THE UTAH TRUST DEED ACT. 
vi-
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The facts in this case are not in dispute. The issues 
involved present only questions of statutory interpretation 
which are questions of law. This Court is to review the lower 
court's decision only for correctness, without according any 
deference thereto. Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 
1989); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988); Asav v. 
Watkins, 751 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1988). 
STATUTES AND RULES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Code Annotated 
§7-15-1 Civil liability of issuer—Notice. 
(1) Any person who makes, draws, signs, or issues any check, 
draft, order, or other instrument upon any depository 
institution, whether as corporate agent or otherwise, for the 
purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation any money, merchandise, property, or other thing 
of value or paying for any service, wages, salary, or rent, 
shall be liable to the holder of the check, draft, order, or 
other instrument if the check, draft, order, or other 
instrument is not honored upon presentment and is marked 
"refer to maker" or the account with the depository upon which 
the check, draft, order, or other instrument has been made or 
drawn does not exist, has been closed, or does not have 
sufficient funds or sufficient credit with the depository for 
payment of the check, draft, or other instrument in full. 
§57-1-24 Sale of trust property by trustee—Notice of 
default. 
The power of sale conferred upon the trustee may not be 
exercised until: 
(1) The trustee first files for record, in the office of the 
recorder of each county where the trust property or some part 
or parcel thereof is situated, a notice of default, 
identifying the trust deed by stating the name of the trustor 
named therein and giving the book and page where the trust 
deed is recorded and a legal description of the trust 
property, and containing a statement that a breach of an 
obligation for which the trust property was conveyed as 
security has occurred, and setting forth the nature of that 
breach and of his election to sell or cause to be sold the 
property to satisfy the obligation; 
(2) Not less than three months has thereafter elapsed; and 
(3) After the lapse of at least three months the trustee 
shall give notice of sale as provided in this act. 
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§57-1-32 Sale of trust property by trustee—Action to 
recover balance due upon obligation for which trust 
deed was given as security. 
At any time within three months after any sale of property 
under a trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be 
commenced to recover the balance due upon the obligation for 
which the trust deed was given as security, and in such action 
the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the 
indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount 
for which such property was sold, and the fair market value 
thereof at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the 
court shall find the fair market value at the date of sale of 
the property sold. The court may not render judgment for more 
than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with 
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and 
attorney's fees, exceeds the fair market value of the property 
as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under this 
section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its 
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an 
action under this section. 
§63-30-13 Claim against political subdivision or its 
employee—Time for filing notice• 
A claim against a political subdivision, or against its 
employee for an act or omission occurring during the 
performance of his duties, within the scope of employment, or 
under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision 
within one year after the claim arises, or before the 
expiration of any extension of time granted under Section 63-
30-11, regardless of whether or not the function giving rise 
to the claim is characterized as governmental. 
§63-30-15 Denial of claim for injury—Authority and time for 
filing action against governmental entity. 
(BEFORE AMENDMENT) 
If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action 
in the district court against the governmental entity in those 
circumstances where immunity from suit has been waived as in 
this act provided. Said action must be commenced within one 
year after denial or the denial period as specified herein. 
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§63-30-15 Denial of claim for injury—Authority and time for 
filing action against governmental entity. 
(AFTER AMENDMENT) 
(1) If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an 
action in the district court against the governmental entity 
or an employee of the entity. 
(2) The claimant shall begin the action within one year 
after denial of the claim or within one year after the denial 
period specified in this chapter has expired, regardless of 
whether or not the function giving rise to the claim is 
characterized as governmental. 
§78-12-1 Time for commencement of actions generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the periods 
prescribed in this chapter, after the cause of action has 
accrued, except in specific cases where a different limitation 
is prescribed by statute. 
§78-12-26 Within three years. 
Within three years: 
(1) an action for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real 
property; except that when waste or trespass is 
committed by means of underground works upon any mining claim, 
the cause of action does not accrue until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting such waste or 
trespass. 
(2) an action for taking, detaining, or injuring personal 
property, including actions for specific recovery thereof; 
except that in all cases where the subject of the action is a 
domestic animal usually included in the term "livestock", 
which at the time of its loss has a recorded mark or brand, if 
the animal strayed or was stolen from the true owner without 
the owner's fault, the cause does not accrue until the owner 
has actual knowledge of such facts as would put a reasonable 
man upon inquiry as to the possession of the animal by the 
defendant. 
(3) an action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; 
except that the cause of action in such case does not accrue 
until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake. 
(4) an action for a liability created by the statutes of 
this state, other than for a penalty or forfeiture under the 
laws of this state, except where in special cases a different 
limitation is prescribed by the statutes of this state. 
-ix-
(5) an action to enforce liability imposed by §78-17-3, 
except that the cause of action does not accrue until the 
aggrieved party knows or reasonably should know of the harm 
suffered. 
§78-12-28 Within two years. 
Within two years, an action: 
(1) against a marshal, sheriff, constable, or other officer 
upon a liability incurred by the doing of an act in his 
official capacity, and in virtue of his office, or by the 
omission of an official duty, including the nonpayment of 
money collected upon an execution; but this section does not 
apply to an action for an escape; 
(2) for recovery damages for the death of one caused by the 
wrongful act or neglect of another; or 
(3) for injury to the personal rights of another as a civil 
rights suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. 
§78-12-29 Within one year. 
Within one year: 
(1) an action for liability created by the statutes of a 
foreign state. 
(2) an action upon a statute or a penalty or forfeiture 
where the action is given to an individual, or to an 
individual and the state, except when the statute imposing it 
prescribes a different limitation. 
(3) an action upon a statute, or upon an undertaking in a 
criminal action, for a forfeiture or penalty to the state. 
(4) an action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false 
imprisonment or seduction. 
(5) an action against a sheriff or other officer for the 
escape of a prisoner arrested or imprisoned upon either civil 
or criminal process. 
(6) an action against a municipal corporation for damages 
or injuries to property caused by a mob or riot. 
§78-12-40 Effect of failure of action not on merits. 
If any action is commenced within due time and a judgment 
thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff 
fails in such action or upon a cause of action otherwise than 
upon the merits, and the time limited either by law or 
contract for commencing the same shall have expired, the 
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action within one year 
after the reversal or failure. 
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§78-14-2 Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of 
act. 
The legislature finds and declares that the number of suits 
and claims for damages and the amount of judgments and 
settlements arising from health care has increased greatly in 
recent years. Because of these increases the insurance 
industry has substantially increased the cost of medical 
malpractice insurance. The effect of increased insurance 
premiums and increased claims is increased care cost, both 
through the health care providers passing the cost of premiums 
to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive 
medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary 
in a lawsuit. Further, certain health care providers are 
discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the 
high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice 
insurance. 
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of 
alleviating the adverse effects which these trends are 
producing in the public's health care system, it is necessary 
to protect the public interest by enacting measures designed 
to encourage private insurance companies to continue to 
provide health-related malpractice insurance while at the same 
time establishing a mechanism to ensure the availability of 
insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from 
private companies. 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature 
to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced 
against health care providers while limiting that time to a 
specific period for which professional liability insurance 
premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated; and to 
provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation 
and settlement of claims. 
-XI-
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OP THE 
STATE OP UTAH 
STANDARD FEDERAL SAVINGS AND ' 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, a federally 
chartered savings and loan, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
THOMAS K. KIRKBRIDE and 
RUFE SOULE, both individuals, 
Defendants-Appellants, 
Case No, 90-0017 
APPELLANTS1 BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The plaintif f-appellee, Standard Federal Savings and Loan 
Association (hereinafter referred to as "Standard"), filed a 
prior action against defendants-appellants, Thomas K. 
Kirkbride and Rufe Soule (hereinafter referred to as 
"Kirkbride and Soule"), to recover a deficiency asserted to be 
due after a trustee's sale under a trust deed against real 
property in Park City, Utah. That action was dismissed 
without prejudice. This action was then filed by Standard 
against Kirkbride and Soule more than two years after the 
trustee's sale. Kirkbride and Soule filed a motion to dismiss 
1 
on the grounds that the complaint was not filed within three 
months of the trustee's sale as required by §57-1-32, Utah 
Code Annotated. 
Disposition in the Lower Court 
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss in reliance 
on §78-12-40, U.C.A., which allows certain actions to be 
refiled within a year after they have been dismissed without 
prejudice. However, since this was a matter of first 
impression in the State of Utah and could be conclusive of all 
issues in this case, the lower court certified its decision 
for appeal. Although that certification was not binding on 
this Court, the petition of Kirkbride and Soule for permission 
to appeal was granted. 
Statement of Facts 
On November 27, 1984, Kirkbride and Soule signed and 
delivered to Standard a promissory note for $244,000.00 (R.8) 
and secured that note with a deed of trust covering real 
property in Park City, Utah (R.ll). Because of a delinquency 
in payments due under the note, a Notice of Default was 
recorded November 5, 1986 (R.17) and, thereafter, on February 
2, 1987, before three months had expired, a Notice of 
Trustee's Sale was issued setting a trustee's sale for March 
11, 1987 (R.19). On March 11, 1987 the trustee sold the 
2 
property to Standard for $150,000.00 and a trustee's deed was 
issued and recorded that same day (R.20). 
Although the date of filing is not alleged in Standard's 
complaint, a prior complaint was filed by Standard on June 8, 
1987 seeking a deficiency judgment in the amount of 
$116,400.00 against Kirkbride and Soule (R.44). The summons 
in that action was not issued until February 8, 1988. That 
complaint did not contain any allegation as to the fair market 
value of the property. (R.44) Kirkbride and Soule filed a 
motion to dismiss the complaint on that ground and on the 
additional ground that no summons had been issued within three 
months from the date of filing of the complaint as required by 
Rule 4(b), U.R.C.P. That motion to dismiss was granted by 
the court on the latter ground and the case was dismissed 
without prejudice on May 2, 1988 (R.7). 
Thereafter, on March 13, 1989, more than two years after 
the trustee's sale, Standard filed a second complaint seeking 
a deficiency judgment against Kirkbride and Soule based on the 
trustee's sale of March 11, 1987 (R.l). Kirkbride and Soule 
filed a motion to dismiss this complaint on the ground that it 
was not filed within the three-month time requirement of §57-
1-32, U.C.A. and failed to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted (R.27). The lower court denied the motion to 
dismiss in its ruling from the bench but certified its 
These facts do not appear in the record in this case but appear in 
the file in the prior action and are not in dispute. 
3 
decision for immediate appeal under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P. 
(R.72) and signed the Certification for Appeal and the Order 
denying the motion to dismiss on December 19 , 1989 and 
December 28, 1989, respectively (R.73 and 76). A Petition for 
Permission to Appeal was filed January 12, 1990 (R.80) and 
granted March 7, 1990 (R.79). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. SECTION 57-1-32 IS THE EXCLUSIVE REMEDY FOR A DEFICIENCY 
AFTER A TRUSTEE'S SALE. 
The Utah Trust Deed Act requires a suit for a deficiency 
judgment to be filed within three months of the trustee's 
sale. This is the exclusive remedy for a deficiency after a 
trustee's sale and the failure of Standard to file this suit 
within that time period is a forfeiture of that right. While 
a prior action was filed within the three-month period and was 
dismissed without prejudice, the right to a deficiency was not 
saved by the renewal statute of §78-12-40, which allows some 
actions dismissed other than on the merits to be refiled 
within a year of the dismissal. There are several reasons why 
the renewal statute does not apply: 
A. THE STRICT REQUIREMENTS OF THE TRUST DEED ACT 
CANNOT BE NULLIFIED BY THE RENEWAL STATUTE. 
Because the Utah Trust Deed Act eliminates the 
judicial protections and the redemption period available to a 
debtor in order to allow a creditor to foreclose more quickly 
4 
in an ex parte, non-judicial proceeding, that act has been and 
should be strictly construed. Each of its requirements is 
intended to protect the debtor and preserve his property and 
is a condition on the creditor's right to a deficiency. Those 
strict substantive requirements cannot be overridden by the 
procedural extension provisions of the renewal statute. It is 
inconceivable that a three-month substantive right would be 
extended, after its expiration, especially for an additional 
year because of the plaintiff's own procedural failures. 
B, THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTES AND A REASONABLE 
CONSTRUCTION TO AVOID CONFLICT MAKES THE RENEWAL 
STATUTE INAPPLICABLE TO THE TRUST DEED ACT. 
Neither the intent nor the words used by the 1872 
legislature should abrogate the intent of the 1961 
legislature. The letter of a statute should not prevail over 
its purpose. The words of the renewal statute have not been 
applied literally in the past and they should not be so 
applied here when such application would result in unintended 
consequences. The trust deed act and the renewal statute can 
be reasonably construed to avoid conflict and to give full 
effect to both. Furthermore, §78-12-1, U.C.A., clearly makes 
the renewal statute inapplicable to statutory causes of action 
which contain their own internal time limitations. 
C. THE THREE-MONTH RIGHT TO A DEFICIENCY IS A 
JURISDICTIONAL RESTRICTION ON THE EXERCISE OF THAT 
RIGHT, 
The majority of courts throughout the country hold 
that statutes which create rights with self-contained time 
limitations are not affected by renewal statutes. This is 
consistent with the Utah cases which hold these internal time 
limitations to be conditions of the liability itself and not 
just limitations on the remedy. The three-month limit on a 
deficiency action is not a statute of limitation and is not 
governed by any of the provisions in the codified statutes of 
limitation, including the renewal statute. 
D. ALL UTAH CASES ARE CONSISTENT IN NOT APPLYING THE 
RENEWAL STATUTE TO STATUTORY CAUSES OF ACTION WITH 
INTERNAL LIMITATIONS. 
While no Utah cases have been found which rule on 
the application of the renewal statute to the trust deed act, 
all of the Utah cases which consider the application of the 
renewal statute to other causes of action are consistent with 
and support the view that the right to file a deficiency is 
not extended by the renewal statute. Any application of the 
renewal statute has been either to a non-statutory cause of 
action, to a statutory cause of action without its own time 
limitation, or to a statute with its own time limitation but 
which does not create the cause of action. In the latter 
case, the statute was within Chapter 12 of Title 78 and was, 
therefore, appropriately governed by the renewal statute in 
Chapter 12 of Title 78. No case has applied the renewal 
statute to a statutory cause of action with its own time 
limitation. 
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II• STANDARD AND THE TRUSTEE HAD NO RIGHT TO PROCEED WITH A 
SALE AND A DEFICIENCY ACTION BECAUSE THE REINSTATEMENT 
PERIOD HAD NOT EXPIRED. 
The trustee's failure to allow a three-month 
reinstatement period before proceeding with the trustee's sale 
was an additional violation of the strict requirements of the 
trust deed act. He had no authority to sell the property or 
give notice of the sale until that reinstatement period 
expired and that failure was another precondition to the right 
to sue for a deficiency. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
STANDARD'S COMPLAINT WAS NOT PILED WITHIN THREE 
MONTHS OP THE TRUSTEED SALE AS REQUIRED BY §57-1-
32, U.C.A. THIS TIME RESTRICTION IS A 
JURISDICTIONAL CONDITION ON THE RIGHT TO A 
DEFICIENCY THAT IS NOT EXTENDED BY THE RENEWAL 
STATUTE OP §78-12-40, U.C.A., WHICH APPLIES ONLY TO 
GENERAL STATUTES OP LIMITATION. 
Standard foreclosed its trust deed against Kirkbride and 
Soule in a private trustee's sale pursuant to the Utah Trust 
Deed Act (§57-1-19 through 36, U.C^A.) and is now seeking to 
recover a deficiency against Kirkbride and Soule pursuant to 
§57-1-32 of that Act, which provides as follows: 
"At any time within three months after any sale of 
property under a trust deed, as hereinabove 
provided, an action may be commenced to recover the 
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust 
deed was given as security, . . . ." 
This section "provides the exclusive procedure for securing a 
deficiency judgment following a trustee's sale of the real 
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property under a trust deed." Cox v. Green. 696 P. 2d 1207 
(Utah 1985) , at 1208. In that case the court held that "since 
plaintiffs' action was not filed within three months of the 
date of the trustee's sale of the real property, 
plaintiffs are not entitled to a deficiency judgment." This 
position was upheld even with respect to the holder of a note 
secured by a second trust deed after a trustee's sale by the 
holder of the first trust deed in City Consumer Services, Inc. 
v. Peters. Case No. 880153, filed May 3, 1990 (Utah Sup. Ct.). 
The remedy of §57-1-32, U.C.A., is exclusive after any 
trustee's sale of the security. 
In this matter, Standard held its trustee's sale on March 
11, 1987 and filed an action under §57-1-32 to recover a 
deficiency against Kirkbride and Soule but that action was 
dismissed on May 2, 1988. Standard then filed a new action on 
March 13, 1989, ten months after the dismissal of the prior 
action and two years after the trustee's sale. Standard 
recognizes that its action is too late under §57-1-32, which 
requires such actions to be filed within three months after 
the trustee's sale, but it claims the right to file this new 
action under §78-12-40, U.C.A., which provides as follows: 
"If any action is commenced within due time and a 
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or 
if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a 
cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and 
the time limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the same shall have expired, the 
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action 
survives, his representatives, may commence a new 
action within one year after the reversal or 
failure." 
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While, on the surface, this renewal or savings statute, 
as such statutes are called, appears to allow this action to 
be refiled, neither the law nor common sense supports that 
position. There are several reasons why the renewal statute 
does not apply to the Utah Trust Deed Act. 
A. THE UTAH TRUST DEED ACT IS TO BE STRICTLY 
CONSTRUED AND THE RENEWAL STATUTE WAS NOT 
INTENDED TO ALTER THOSE STRICT REQUIREMENTS, 
The Utah Trust Deed Act, like those in effect in other 
states, was enacted, in part, to provide a more speedy and 
efficient foreclosure remedy. However, since that remedy has 
eliminated the traditional protections available to a debtor, 
such as judicial notice and hearing, judicial supervision, 
sale by a public officer, and a redemption period, such 
statutes are to be strictly construed. 59 C.J.S., Mortgages, 
§557, which provides: 
"A power of sale contained in a mortgage or deed of 
trust must be strictly pursued, and, in order to 
render the sale valid, there must be a full 
compliance with all its terms and conditions which 
have not been waived. There must also be a 
compliance with all legal requirements for a valid 
sale, and a misstep or defect in matter of 
substance cannot be cured by showing that it was 
accidental or caused by mistake and was not the 
result of fraud or bad faith." 
And, then at page 920: 
"Where statutes regulate the exercise of powers of 
sale in mortgages and trust deeds, full compliance 
with such provisions is essential to the validity 
of the sale. The statute in such cases supersedes 
the grant of power in the mortgage and is read into 
it as though set out therein." 
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The Utah Supreme Court, in Concepts. Inc. v. First 
Security Realty Services. Inc., 743 P. 2d 1158 (Utah 1987), by 
citation to other cases, has stated, at pp. 1160-61: 
"The reason for strict compliance with the statute 
*is to protect the property of the debtor1 . . . . 
*The grantor of the power is entitled to have his 
directions obeyed; to have the proper notice of 
sale given; to have it take place at the time and 
place, and by the person appointed by him1. . . 
.
 xThe right of a grantor of a deed of trust to have 
its provision strictly complied with to effect a 
valid foreclosure sale is absolute.1" 
The court then held the defendant's attempt to extend the time 
for filing a deficiency action by scheduling a second 
trustee's sale invalid, in these words: 
" . . . Defendant thereafter [after the trustee's 
sale] had three months to institute action to 
recover any balance due on the obligation for which 
the trust deeds were given as security. Utah Code 
Ann. §57-1-32. Once a trust deed sale has been 
made, that remedy is the exclusive remedy under 
statute . . . . 
" . . . Defendant's failure to bring a deficiency 
action within three months after the sale of the 
property terminated all of plaintiffs' remaining 
obligations, and defendant's attempt at 
rescheduling the same property for a second sale 
was improper as a matter of law." 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held, in Blodaett v. Martsch, 
590 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1978), that the trustee under a deed of 
trust has a fiduciary relationship with the trustor which 
imposes on the trustee "a duty to treat the trustor fairly and 
in accordance with a high punctilio of honor" (p. 302) and to 
comply with the "clear statutory duties" (p. 303). 
This view of the strictness with which the statutory 
requirements must be followed applies equally to that portion 
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of the statute which limits the right to sue for a deficiency 
to three months. This is clear from Cox v. Green and City 
Consumer Services. Inc. v. Peters, supra, which held the 
three-month period for a deficiency action to be the exclusive 
remedy after any trustee's sale of the property, but is 
especially obvious from Concepts, Inc. v. First Security 
Realty Services, Inc., supra. where an attempt to extend the 
time for filing a deficiency action was invalidated. If the 
strict requirements of the Utah Trust Deed Act are not 
followed, the beneficiary has the benefit of the trust deed 
procedure without paying the price for those benefits. As 
expressed by the Court of Appeals in G. Adams Limited 
Partnership v. Durbana, 782 P.2d 962 (Utah App. 1989), at 964: 
"Nonjudicial foreclosure of a trust deed spares the 
beneficiary the cost of a lawsuit and the delay and 
uncertainty of a six-month redemption period. It 
is appropriate however, to impose a price on these 
benefits. The price is chiefly in the form of 
restrictions on the availability of a deficiency 
judgment. The action must be brought almost 
immediately and the deficiency amount will be 
calculated with reference to the fair market value 
of the property rather than the amount bid. See 
Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 (1986). It is fair to 
extract this price from the beneficiary who made 
the decision to take the nonjudicial shortcut." 
And, of course, a failure to follow the strict requirements of 
the Trust Deed Act causes the debtor to lose both the benefits 
of a judicial foreclosure (notice, hearing, judicial 
supervision, sale by a public officer, redemption period, 
See also Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37 (Utah App. 1988) at 41, ftn. 2. 
etc.) and the benefits of the trust deed procedure (limited 
time for deficiency action, deficiency amount limited by fair 
market value of property, etc.)^ Therefore, the strict 
construction of the Trust Deed Act must be maintained to 
preserve its own purpose and justification. 
In view of the strictness with which the Utah Trust Deed 
Act is to be interpreted and the exclusive three-month remedy 
provided therein for a deficiency, it is not conceivable that 
the renewal statute should apply to destroy that strictness 
and exclusivity by extending a three-month right for an 
additional year after the expiration of the three months. It 
does not make sense to extend the length of a time-limited 
right beyond what it was originally. The narrow and exact 
nature of the provisions of the Trust Deed Act would be 
nullified. 
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND THE RULES OF STATUTORY 
CONSTRUCTION WOULD NOT APPLY THE RENEWAL 
STATUTE TO THE UTAH TRUST DEED ACT. 
Beyond the common sense normally applied in statutory 
interpretation that would not extend for one whole year the 
right to file an action which must be brought within three 
months in the first place, there are well-recognized rules of 
statutory construction and of implied legislative intent that 
support the position that the right to a deficiency after a 
trustee's sale is not renewed by §78-12-40, U.C.A. Utah's 
first renewal statute was adopted in 1872 • See Laws 1872, Ch. 
IV, §27, p.24. The Utah Trust Deed Act was not adopted until 
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1961. See §57-1-19, U.C.A., 1953 (Supp. 1961). Obviously, 
the 1961 legislature did not intend that the 1872 legislature 
override the clear limitations of §57-1-32, U.C.A. If 
anything, the reverse would have been intended. For example, 
if the renewal statute were allowed to override the exclusive 
remedy of the trust deed act, it would be possible for a party 
to file an action for a deficiency, dismiss it voluntarily, as 
was allowed in Luke v. Bennion, 36 Utah 61, 106 Pac. 712 
(1909) , and obtain an extra year to file the action under the 
renewal statute. That result could not have been intended by 
the legislature. 
To suggest that the 1872 legislature intended the words 
"any action" to apply to all causes of action created, and to 
all circumstances which may exist, in the future, about which 
it had no knowledge, is to impute to it a prescience which it 
would not have claimed for itself. Courts are frequently 
called upon to rule upon the application of statutes to 
situations not contemplated by the legislators who adopted the 
statutes. The applicable rule was stated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 14 3 
U.S. 457, 12 S.Ct. 511, 36 L.Ed. 226 (1892) as follows: 
"It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within 
the letter of the statute and yet not within the 
statute, because not within its spirit, nor within 
the intention of its makers. This has been often 
asserted, and the reports are full of cases 
illustrating its application. This is not the 
substitution of the will of the judge for that of 
the legislator, for frequently words of general 
meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough 
to include an act in question, and yet a 
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consideration of the whole legislation, or of the 
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the 
absurd results which follow from giving such broad 
meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to 
believe that the legislator intended to include the 
particular act." 
The court then quoted from United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 
482, 19 L.Ed. 278: 
"All laws should receive a sensible construction. 
General terms should be so limited in their 
application as not to lead to injustice, oppression 
or an absurd consequence. It will always, 
therefore, be presumed that the legislature 
intended exceptions to its language which would 
avoid results of this character. The reason of the 
law in such cases should prevail over its letter." 
This same principle has been followed in Utah, as stated 
in Stanton Transportation Co. v. Davis, 9 U.2d 184, 341 P.2d 
207, 209 (1959), a case which refused to include within the 
mechanic's lien statute the expenses of transporting a 
drilling rig to a well site even though the words of the 
statute appeared to include them: 
"It is to be conceded that a cursory reading of 
that language makes Stanton's position seem quite 
plausible. However, it requires but little 
reflection to realize that if the statute were 
given such a broad interpretation, the door would 
be open to the inclusion of any service pertaining 
to the planning, exploration, solicitation of 
finances, advertising, or even such things as 
office rentals or legal services, which may be 
regarded as bearing upon the development of an oil 
well. This would distort the statute beyond its 
design and make it impractical in its operation. 
"When uncertainty exists as to the interpretation 
and application of a statute, it is appropriate to 
look to its purpose in the light of its background 
and history, and also to the effect it will have in 
practical application." 
And then at 210: 
14 
"While it is true that our statutes are to be 
liberally construed to give effect to their purpose 
and to promote justice, it is equally true that 
they should not be distorted beyond the intent of 
the 1egis1ature." 
That principle was again followed in Mountain States Tel. 
& Tel. Co, v. Payne. 782 P.2d 464 (Utah 1989), a case, like 
the one now before the court, in which the word "any" on the 
face of the statute, appeared to be all inclusive, but the 
court held otherwise. The statute involved was §7-15-1(1), 
U.C.A., which provides: 
"Any person who makes, draws, signs or issues any 
check, draft, order or other instrument upon any 
depository institution, whether as corporate agent 
or otherwise, for the purpose of obtaining from any 
person, firm, partnership, or corporation any 
money, merchandise, property or other thing of 
value or paying for any service, wages, salary or 
rent, shall be liable to the holder of the check, 
draft, order, or other instrument if the check, 
draft, order or other instrument is not honored 
upon presentment . . . ." (emphasis added) 
Relying on the principle set forth in Stanton Transportation 
Co. , supra, the court in Mountain States Tel. & Tel, held, at 
466-7: 
"It seems unlikely to us that the legislature 
intended the statute at issue in this case to 
subject innocent employees who sign checks at the 
direction of their employees to personal liability 
. . . . we may construe section 7-15-1 to require 
that the signator of a bad check personally receive 
benefits, services, or money transfer, or in the 
alternative, have actual knowledge that the check 
is drawn on insufficient funds in order to be held 
liable." 
Likewise, the words "any action" in §78-12-40 should be 
construed to exclude unintended results, especially as applied 
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to acts of the legislature adopted nearly one hundred years 
later. 
That the words of §78-12-40 are not to be read literally 
but rather have flexible meanings is the holding of Thomas v. 
Heirs of Braffet. 6 U.2d 57, 305 Po2d 507, 510-11 (1956), in 
which the word "plaintiff" was construed to include defendants 
who had filed an answer in the prior action. Obviously, the 
words of §78-12-40 have been given flexible meanings to 
prevent unreasonable results. 
Interestingly, Mountain States Tel. & Tel., supra, had a 
secondary basis for its decision which also applies here. The 
court pointed out a conflict between the literal wording of 
§7-15-1 and §70A-3-403(2) and concluded: 
"Where possible, statutes should be construed to be 
mutually consistent . . . . Therefore, if section 
7-15-1 is read as imposing strict liability, 
amended section 70A-3-403 would have to be read to 
exclude checks from its operation, and the uniform 
application and the liberal construction intended 
for the Uniform Commercial Code would be defeated. 
If, however, section 7-15-1 is interpreted as 
merely providing an expedited remedy against a 
party who is liable under section 70A-3-403, then 
section 7-15-1 can reasonably be construed to avoid 
impliedly repealing section 70A-3-403." 
Similarly, the strict construction intended for the Utah Trust 
Deed Act would be defeated if §78-12-40 is read literally and 
standing alone. Since the trust deed act was adopted later, 
it makes more sense to conclude that it impliedly amended the 
3But see Cunn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571 (Utah 1983), in which "plaintiff" 
did not include a decedent's statutory heirs who had not been plaintiffs 
in the first action. 
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renewal statute rather than making the trust deed act subject 
to the earlier renewal statute. However, there is another 
long-standing and prevailing rule of law which allows these 
two statutes to be reasonably construed to avoid an implied 
repeal or amendment of either one of them. That rule is 
discussed in Point I.e. below. 
Standard has argued in the lower court that "if the 
legislature had wanted the trust deed statute to be excepted 
from the operation of the savings statute, it easily could 
have done so." (R.39) The response to this argument is that 
the legislature did except the trust deed statute from the 
operation of the savings statute by including therein its own 
limitation period rather than to allow the general statute of 
limitations to apply. The Supreme Court, in State v. Lavoto, 
776 P.2d 912 (Utah 1989), held that a "statute of limitations 
that is created in the same act which establishes a new or 
revised definition of a crime is deemed applicable to those 
crimes included in the same act unless the Legislature clearly 
provides otherwise." Therefore, the three-month limitation 
applies to a deficiency action under the trust deed act unless 
the legislature, in that act, clearly provided otherwise, 
which it did not. The legislature has, however, clearly 
provided, in its codification of the general statutes of 
limitations, that the general statutes of limitations do not 
apply to "specific cases where a different limitation is 
prescribed by statute." To display the complete picture drawn 
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by this codification, all of the sections making reference to 
other statutes and the renewal statute are quoted, including 
the introductory section: 
"78-12-1. Time for commencement of actions 
generally. 
Civil actions may be commenced only within the 
periods prescribed in this chapter, after the cause 
of action has accrued, except in specific cases 
where a different limitation is prescribed by 
statute. 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
• • • • 
(4) an action for a liability created by the 
statutes of this state, other than for a penalty or 
forfeiture under the laws of this state, except 
where in special cases a different limitation is 
prescribed by the statutes of this state. 
78-12-29. Within one year. 
• • • • 
(2) an action upon a statute for a penalty or 
forfeiture where the action is given to an 
individual, or to an individual and the state, 
except when the statute imposing it prescribes a 
different limitation. 
78-12-40. Effect of failure of action not on 
merits. 
If any action is commenced within due time and a 
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or 
if the plaintiff fails in such action or upon a 
cause of action otherwise than upon the merits, and 
the time limited either by law or contract for 
commencing the same shall have expired, the 
plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of action 
survives, his representatives, may commence a new 
action within one year after the reversal or 
failure." (emphasis added) 
A careful reading of these sections clearly shows that 
the legislature has provided that the "special cases" of 
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"different limitations . . . prescribed by" other statutes 
shall be governed by those different limitations and not by 
these general statutes of limitation. In particular, "the 
periods prescribed in this chapter," that is, Chapter 12 of 
Title 78, which includes the one year extension of §78-12-40, 
do not apply to the "specific cases where a different 
limitation is prescribed by statute," §78-12-1. Thus, the 
legislature has clearly provided that the "different 
limitation" prescribed in §57-1-32 is not governed by the 
limitation periods of Chapter 12, Title 78 and is not extended 
by the renewal statute of §78-12-40. 
As between §57-1-32 and §78-12-40, the rule of statutory 
construction which applies is the rule which would apply a 
reasonable construction to uphold both provisions as written 
without conflict. The interpretation which avoids any 
conflict between the two statutes is the one which does not 
apply the renewal statute to the trust deed statute. As 
between §57-1-32 and §78-12-1, the rule of statutory 
construction which applies is commonly known as the plain 
meaning rule. Where a statute is clear upon its face and is 
susceptible of but one construction, that construction must be 
given to it. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U.S. 414, 421, 20 
S.Ct. 155, 44- L.Ed. 219 (1899). This rule is supported by 
another rule of statutory construction, relied on in Grayson 
Roper Ltd. Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989), 
at 471-2: 
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. . . separate parts of an act should not be 
construed in isolation from the rest of the act • . 
. and the terms of related code provisions should 
be construed in a harmonious fashion . . . ." 
Section 78-12-1 plainly excludes the application of Chapter 12 
time periods, and extensions thereof, to other statutes which 
contain their own time limitations. 
C. CAUSES OP ACTION CREATED BY STATUTE AND WHICH 
CONTAIN THEIR OWN TIME LIMITATIONS ARE NOT 
AFFECTED BY RENEWAL STATUTES. 
Furthermore, statutes, such as the Utah Trust Deed 
Act, which create causes of action not recognized by the 
common law and which contain their own time limitations are 
not affected by renewal statutes. Such self-contained time 
requirements are not considered to be statutes of limitations 
but rather conditions precedent to the bringing of the action 
itself. This position is stated in 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation 
of Actions, §309, as follows: 
"§309. Application to statutory causes of action. 
Generally speaking, statutes permitting a new 
action to be brought after the expiration of the 
period of limitations, upon the failure of a 
previous action commenced within that period, have 
been regarded as applying to actions founded upon 
nonstatutory rights or upon rights formerly 
existing independently of statute. Moreover, where 
a statute creates a right of action which did not 
exist at common law, and which does not obtain in 
the absence of such statute, the limitation 
prescribed therein, within which such action must 
be commenced, is a condition imposed upon the 
exercise of the right of action granted, and this 
time is not extended by the pendency and dismissal 
of a former action. This is because the time limit 
described in such a statute is ordinarily regarded 
as a limitation upon the right itself, so that when 
the time expires, the right is extinguished except 
as to actions then pending." 
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Thus, renewal statutes have been held not applicable to 
actions to contest an election governed by an internal 20-day 
limitation, Casey v. Burdine, 214 Ark. 680, 217 S.W. 2d 613 
(1949); to a summary proceeding to foreclose a lien on a 
sawmill, Walker v. Burt, 57 Ga. 20 (1876); to a statutory 
right of foreclosure on a materialmen's lien with an internal 
limitation, Chamlee Lumber Co. v. Crichton, 136 Ga. 391, 71 
S.E. 673 (1911); to a statutory action to revive a judgment 
governed by an internal limitation, Berkley v. Tootle, 62 Kan. 
701, 64 Pac. 620 (1901) ; to a statutory action contesting the 
validity of a will governed by an internal limitation, Re 
Estate of Speake, 743 P. 2d 648 (1987 Okla.); Peacock v. 
Churchill, 38 111. App. 634, 120 ALR 381 (1890); to an action 
for reinstatement of a police officer, King v. Butte, 71 Mont. 
309, 230 Pac. 62 (1924); to the 90-day period for bringing an 
action on a claim rejected by an administrator, Poole v. 
Rutherford, 199 S.W. 2d 665 (1947 Tex. Civ. App.); to the 20-
day period allowed for contesting a workman's compensation 
award (even though the renewal statute only allowed 60 days to 
refile) , Leadon v. Truck Ins. Exchange, 253 S.W. 2d 903 (1952 
Tex. Civ. App.); and even to wrongful death statutes 
containing their own limitation periods, Rodman v. Missouri 
Pac. R.R. Co. , 65 Kan. 645, 70 Pac. 642 (1902) . This position 
is the overwhelming majority view. For a review of these and 
many other cases with similar holdings, see Annotation, 79 ALR 
2d 1309 (1961), especially §5 at pp. 1323-26. 
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Although the renewal statute was not involved, the Utah 
decisions are consistent with this widely accepted position. 
In AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree Development and Energy Co. , 714 
P. 2d 289 (Utah 1986) , the Utah Supreme Court held that §38-1-
11, U.C.A., the Utah Mechanics1 Lien Statute, which requires 
an action to enforce the lien to be brought within 12 months, 
was jurisdictional and: 
"limits a lienor's rights to 12 months after his 
work is completed. At that point both his rights 
and his remedies under the statute are 
extinguished" (at 292). 
The court further stated, at p. 291: 
"Mechanics' liens are statutory creatures unknown 
to the common law. . . . compliance with the 
statute is required before a party is entitled to 
the benefits created by the statute." 
And then quoting from D. M. Foley Co. , Inc. v. North West Fed. 
S & L Assoc. , 122 111. App. 3d 411, 77 111. Dec. 877, 461 N.E. 
2d 500 (1984), the court stated: 
"The statutory period *is not merely a statute of 
limitations but a condition of liability itself and 
not just a limitation on the remedy'. The court 
held that the potential liability of subsequent 
purchasers perished inchoate when plaintiffs failed 
to bring suit within the period allowed after 
completion of the work." 
Since the statutory period is a condition of liability and not 
a statute of limitation, the renewal statute would not apply 
to extend the time for filing such an action. 
While no Utah decisions have been found specifically 
ruling on the applicability of the renewal statute to the Utah 
Trust Deed Act, the Supreme Court has stated that the time 
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requirements of the Utah Trust Deed Act are not statutes of 
limitation. See McCarthy v, Lewis, 615 P. 2d 1256 (Utah 1980) 
at 1259, ftn 4. In that case it was held that the automatic 
stay of the Bankruptcy Act did not apply to the three-month 
reinstatement provision of the Utah Trust Deed Act, §57-1-24, 
U.C.A. That such time requirements are not statutes of 
limitation is consistent with the general view that the time 
requirements of such statutes are conditions upon the exercise 
of the right itself and are limitations not only of the remedy 
but of the substantive right. 
On the other hand, when the limitation period is not in 
the statute creating the cause of action, the renewal statute 
would apply to extend the time for filing the action. 
Similarly, the tolling provisions of Chapter 12, Title 78, 
would also toll the running of the statute of limitation on a 
statutory cause of action which does not contain its own 
limitation period. This was the holding of Switzer v. 
Reynolds, 606 P. 2d 244 (Utah 1980) with respect to the 
wrongful death statute of §78-11-7 which does not contain a 
limitation period and thus the Title 78, Chapter 12 limitation 
4 
period was tolled by §78-12-36 because of disability. But, 
that case, on p. 246, recognizes and adopts the principle 
which is applicable here: 
4 . . 
For a similar holding with respect to §78-12-35 on tolling by absence 
from the state see Seely v. Cowley, 12 U.2d 252, 365 P.2d 65 (1961). 
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"In a case where the limitation period has been 
construed as merely affecting the remedy but not 
the right of action itself, a tolling statute has 
been held applicable to a statute of limitations 
for wrongful death. In contrast, the limitation 
period was not tolled due to infancy, where the 
wrongful death statute was construed as creating a 
right of action that did not exist at common law 
and thus the time restriction provided therein 
affected the right of action and not merely the 
remedy." 
It is apparent from a review of the cases in this area 
that rights enacted by statute with relatively short time 
requirements attached to those rights should not be affected 
by the renewal statutes which are applicable only to 
procedural statutes of limitation. In this case, the three-
month filing requirement enacted as part of the right to sue 
for a deficiency is a jurisdictional restriction on the 
exercise of that right. The failure to bring this action 
within three months from the trustee's sale bars Standard's 
right to recover a deficiency judgment. 
D. OP ALL THE UTAH CASES WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED 
THE APPLICATION OP THE RENEWAL STATUTE, NONE 
HAS APPLIED IT TO EXTEND THE TIME FOR PILING 
A STATUTORY CAUSE OP ACTION CONTAINING ITS 
OWN INTERNAL TIME LIMITATION. 
As has already been stated, no Utah cases have been 
found which specifically rule on the applicability of the 
renewal statute to the Utah Trust Deed Act. In fact, no such 
cases from any jurisdiction have been found. There are, 
however, numerous Utah decisions which have ruled on the 
applicability of the renewal statute to other causes of 
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action. For example, the renewal statute has been applied to 
a suit on a judgment which had been voluntarily dismissed by 
the plaintiff, Luke v. Bennion, supra; to a suit for damages 
for false imprisonment which had been dismissed just prior to 
trial because the original complaint was not presented to the 
court, Salisbury v. Poulson, 57 Utah 552, 172 Pac. 315 (1918); 
to a suit for breach of a written agreement which had been 
dismissed on a motion for nonsuit which by statute was not a 
determination on the merits, Gutheil v. Gilmer. 27 Utah 496, 
76 Pac. 628 (1904); to a suit to recover a commission which 
had also been dismissed on a motion for nonsuit, Williams v. 
Nelson. 45 Utah 255, 145 pac. 39 (1914) ; to a suit for 
wrongful death, which had been dismissed otherwise than on the 
merits, Platz v. International Smelting Co., 61 Utah 342, 213 
pac. 187 (1923) ; to a suit in federal court to enforce a 
stockholder's liability which had been voluntarily dismissed 
in state court by the plaintiff, Jones v. Jenkins. 22 F.2d 642 
(1927) ; to a suit for negligence under the Utah Health Care 
Malpractice Act which had been dismissed for failure to file 
the required notice with the health care provider at least 90 
days before commencing the action, Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 
144 (Utah 1979); and to a suit for gross negligence against 
former state officers in their individual capacities when a 
prior suit against them in their official capacities had been 
dismissed for failure to file the required notice with the 
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state within one year after the cause of action arose, Madsen 
v, Borthick, 769 P.2d 245 (Utah 1988). 
In each of these cases the time for filing the second 
action was held to be extended by the renewal statute because 
the first action had been timely filed and had been dismissed 
otherwise than on the merits. However, none of them involved 
a statutory action in which the enabling statute contained its 
own time limitation on the filing of the action. The Platz 
case, supra, did involve a wrongful death action, which is 
statutory, but the enabling statute did not provide a time 
limitation. Instead, the general statutes of limitations 
governed such an action. And, indeed, consistent with the 
conclusion in Point I.B., above, the codification of the 
general statutes of limitations includes specifically the 
limitation on wrongful death actions, §78-12-28(2), U.C.A., 
within those covered by Chapter 12 of Title 78 (see §78-12-1) 
and, therefore, affected by the renewal statute of §78-12-40. 
Conversely, the Foil v. Ballinaer case, supra, involves the 
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act which does contain its own 
time limitation but does not create the right to sue for 
negligence, since that right existed at common law. Rather, 
that act was intended to "provide a reasonable time in which 
actions may be commenced against health care providers", §78-
14-2, and is also included within Chapter 12, Title 78 and is, 
therefore, also covered by §78-12-1 and affected by the 
renewal statute of §78-12-40. 
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On the other hand, Foil v. Ballincrer. also involved the 
Utah Governmental Immunity Act, since the case was filed 
against the University of Utah Medical Center as well as the 
individual doctor. The lower court dismissed the action 
against the state entity with prejudice for failure to file 
the prerequisite notice with the state. No appeal was taken 
from that dismissal. Apparently, it was understood that the 
renewal statute would not apply to a claim under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act. However, in a later case, Yates v. 
Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352 (1980), the Supreme 
Court held that the renewal statute does not apply to extend 
the time for filing an action under the Utah Governmental 
Immunity Act when the prerequisite notice is not given because 
§63-30-13 of that Act provides that such a claim is "barred 
unless notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the 
political subdivision within one year after the cause of 
action arises." 
Neither Foil nor Yates reached the question of 
application of the renewal statute if proper notice had been 
filed as required by the Utah Governmental Immunity Act and an 
action had been timely commenced and later dismissed otherwise 
than on the merits. Madsen v. Borthick. supra, also did not 
address this question because it was intentionally filed 
against the former state officials in their individual 
capacities in order to avoid the then-expired time limit for 
filing notice with the state. See 769 P.2d 247, 1st J[. 
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Furthermore, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act did not then 
contain its own limitation for filing a suit against 
governmental employees although it did contain such a 
limitation for filing suit against the governmental entity 
itself. §63-30-15, U.C.A. 1953, Second Replacement Volume 7A 
(1978). Accordingly, Madsen v. Borthick considered the 
general statutes of limitations of §§78-12-26, 28 and 29 to 
apply to the suit against the officials in their individual 
capacities. See text at footnote 13 on page 253 and the next 
to last paragraph on page 254. Section 63-30-15 was amended 
in 1985 (after the cause of action arose in Madsen v. Borthick 
but before the decision thereon) to apply to suits against the 
employees as well as against the governmental entity. 
Therefore, the question as to the applicability of the renewal 
statute to the internal time limitation of the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act has not yet been considered. If 
that question arises, it is submitted that the renewal statute 
would not apply for the reasons set forth in Point I.e., 
above. Alternatively, if it were determined that the renewal 
statute applied, such a determination, in order to be 
consistent with prior decisions, would have to be made based 
on a conclusion that the Utah Governmental Immunity Act does 
not create the cause of action for negligence but only waives 
the immunity of the state and its employees from such actions. 
There appears to be no Utah case which has applied the 
renewal statute to a cause of action created by a statute 
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which contains its own time limitation for the filing of that 
cause of action. On the other hand, all of the Utah cases are 
consistent with and support the position that the renewal 
statute does not apply to such causes of action. 
POINT II 
STANDARD'S CLAIM AGAINST KIRKBRIDE AND SOULE IS 
BARRED FOR FAILURE TO ALLOW THREE MONTHS FOR 
REINSTATEMENT UNDER §57-1-24, U.C.A. OF THE UTAH 
TRUST DEED ACT. 
The standards of strict compliance with the requirements 
of the Utah Trust Deed Act are set forth in Point I.A., above. 
The reasons for strict compliance with those requirements are 
adequately discussed there and need not be repeated here. 
Because the jurisdictional time restriction on a deficiency 
action has been considered central to this case, little 
attention has been given to an additional defect in Standard's 
actions leading up to its trustee's sale. Section 57-1-24, 
U.C.A., provides: 
"The power of sale conferred upon the trustee may 
not be exercised until: 
(1) The trustee first files for record . . . 
a notice of default . . . ; 
(2) Not less than three months has thereafter 
elapsed; and 
(3) After the lapse of at least three months 
the trustee shall give notice of sale as 
provided in this act." (emphasis added) 
In this case, the Notice of Default was recorded November 
5, 1986 (R.17) and the Notice of Trustee's Sale was given on 
February 2, 1987 (R.19), before three months had expired after 
recording of the Notice of Default. Under the clear and 
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strict wording of §57-1-24, the trustee may not exercise the 
power of sale and the notice of sale may not be given until 
"not less than three months" has elapsed after recording the 
notice of default. In view of the strictness with which these 
requirements must be followed, they are conditions on the 
right to exercise the power of sale. Blodgett v. Martsch, 
supra, at 303, holds that the trustee's failure to post sale 
notices where required, to completely describe the property 
and to inquire as to the trustors' preference as to joint or 
sequential sale of tracts, as required by §§57-1-25 and 27, 
may have been violations of these statutory duties. However, 
the requirements of those sections of the trust deed act are 
not prefaced by the conditional words, "may not be exercised 
until," that appear in §57-1-24. A fortiori, a failure to 
follow the requirements of that section, is a violation of 
duty and a bar to further proceedings under the statute. 
All the requirements of the Utah Trust Deed Act are to be 
strictly construed and each of the steps provided in the act 
are preconditions to the exercise of the next step. That is, 
a transfer in trust (§57-1-20), a qualified trustee (§57-1-
21), a breach of the secured obligation (§57-1-23), notice of 
default and reinstatement period (§57-1-24 and 31(1)), notice 
of sale (§57-1-25), and a trustee's sale (§57-1-27) are all 
prerequisite to the right to a deficiency given in §57-1-32. 
A failure to take each of these steps carefully bars the right 
to take the final step to obtain a deficiency. Standard has 
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not only stumbled on its path to a deficiency judgment but has 
skipped an essential step on that path. Its right to a 
deficiency was lost long ago and this court should direct the 
dismissal of its claim with prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Trust Deed Act was enacted to provide a more 
speedy and efficient remedy to enforce real property-secured 
obligations and to realize on the security. This remedy 
eliminated the traditional protections available to the debtor 
and, in return, required the creditor to follow the strict 
requirements of this new remedy. A creditor electing to take 
advantage of the benefits of that more efficient remedy must 
also pay the price of carefully pursuing that remedy according 
to the conditions which control it. Otherwise, he will lose 
the rights given to him. Standard has not met all of the 
conditions which are prerequisite to a deficiency judgment. 
It failed to allow the full reinstatement period and it failed 
to file this action within the time allowed after its 
trustee's sale. Those failures result in a loss of its right 
to a deficiency. 
The strict conditions of the Utah Trust Deed Act are not 
altered by the renewal statute and the rules of statutory 
construction require that the two statutes be construed to 
avoid any conflict and to carry out the purposes of both. The 
codification of the general statutes of limitation clearly 
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provides that the renewal and other provisions of Chapter 12, 
Title 78 do not apply to the Utah Trust Deed Act. 
The time requirements of the trust deed act are not 
statutes of limitation but are jurisdictional conditions on 
the exercise of the rights provided therein. The statutes of 
limitations do not apply to such rights. The majority of 
jurisdictions do not apply renewal statutes to similar 
statutes with internal limitations and the Utah cases which 
have considered the application of the renewal statute or of 
tolling statutes all support and are consistent with this 
view. 
Although the question of application of the renewal 
statute to the trust deed act appears to be a question of 
first impression, the rules of law and the holdings of cases 
involving related questions require that the renewal statute 
not be applied to the trust deed act in order to preserve 
consistency. Such a conclusion is also required to preserve 
the purposes of the trust deed act and will not interfere with 
the purpose of the renewal statute itself. 
Standard had three months after its trustee's sale to 
correctly file an action for a deficiency. Because of its 
careless failure to comply with the strict conditions which 
control its right to a deficiency, it has forfeited that 
right. It is now attempting to use the procedural renewal 
statute to stretch out its substantive three-month right to 
more than two years. That is contrary to the purpose of the 
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trust deed act and should not be allowed. Furthermore, the 
potential for intentional abuse of that purpose should be 
checked. The order of the lower court should, therefore, be 
reversed with instructions to dismiss Standard's Complaint 
with prejudice. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Ralph J. Majtsh 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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